Gulf War

Persian Gulf War
Gulf War Photobox.jpg
Clockwise from top: USAF aircraft flying over burning Kuwaiti oil wells; British troops in Operation Granby; Camera view from a Lockheed AC-130; Highway of Death; M728 Combat Engineer Vehicle
Date August 2, 1990 – February 28, 1991 (Operation Desert Storm officially ended 30 November 1995)[1]
Location Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
Result Coalition victory
  • Imposition of sanctions against Iraq
  • Removal of Iraqi invasion force from Kuwait
  • Heavy Iraqi casualties and destruction of Iraqi and Kuwaiti infrastructure
Belligerents
Coalition forces

 Kuwait
 United States
 Saudi Arabia
 United Kingdom
 Egypt
 United Arab Emirates
 France
 Belgium
 Morocco
 Qatar
 Oman
 Pakistan
 Canada
 Argentina
 Spain
 Italy
and others

Iraq Iraq

Supported by:
Jordan Jordan (Initially, though later withdrew support)

Commanders and leaders
Kuwait Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah
United States George H.W. Bush
United States Norman Schwarzkopf
United States Colin Powell
United States Calvin Waller
Saudi Arabia King Fahd
Saudi Arabia Prince Abdullah
Saudi Arabia Prince Sultan
Saudi Arabia Turki Al-Faisal
Saudi Arabia Saleh Al-Muhaya
Saudi Arabia Khalid bin Sultan[2][3]
United Kingdom John Major
United Kingdom Patrick Hine
United Kingdom Andrew Wilson
United Kingdom Peter de la Billière
United Kingdom John Chapple
France Michel Roquejoffre
Egypt Mohamed Hussein Tantawi
Syria Mustafa Tlass
Qatar Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
Pakistan Mirza Aslam Beg
Iraq Saddam Hussein

Iraq Ali Hassan al-Majid
Iraq Salah Aboud Mahmoud

Strength
959,600[4]
1,820 Fighter aircraft and attack aircraft (1,376 American, 175 Saudi, 69 British, 42 French, 24 Canadian, 8 Italian)
3,318 tanks (mainly M1 Abrams(U.S.), Challenger 1(UK), M60(U.S.))
8 aircraft carriers
2 battleships
20 cruisers
20 destroyers
5 submarines[5]
545,000 (100,000 in Kuwait)+
649 fighters
4,500 tanks (Chinese Type-59s, Type-69s, & self produced T-55 T-62, about 200 Soviet Union T-72M's Asad Babil)[5]
Casualties and losses
240-392 killed[6]
776 wounded[7]
(Coalition)
1,200 killed
(Kuwait)
1,490-1,592 killed total
20,000-35,000 casualties[7]
Kuwaiti civilian deaths:
Over 1,000 Kuwaiti civilians estimated killed during the Iraqi occupation in addition to 300,000 made refugees.[8]

Iraqi civilian deaths:
About 3,664 Iraqi civilians killed.[9]

Other civilian deaths:
2 Israeli civilians killed, 230 injured[10]
1 Saudi civilian killed, 65 injured[11]

The Persian Gulf War (August 2, 1990 – February 28, 1991), commonly referred to as simply the Gulf War, was a war waged by a U.N.-authorized coalition force from thirty-four nations led by the United States against Iraq.

This war has also been referred to (by the former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein) as the mother of all Battles,[12] and is commonly known as Operation Desert Storm for the operational name of the military response,[13] the First Gulf War, or the Iraq War.[14][15][16]

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi troops that began 2 August 1990 was met with international condemnation, and brought immediate economic sanctions against Iraq by members of the UN Security Council. U.S. President George H. W. Bush deployed American forces to Saudi Arabia almost 6 months afterwards, and urged other countries to send their own forces to the scene. An array of nations joined the Coalition of the Gulf War. The great majority of the military forces in the coalition were from the United States, with Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and Egypt as leading contributors, in that order. Around US$40 billion of the US$60 billion cost was paid by Saudi Arabia.[17]

The initial conflict to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait began with an aerial bombardment on 16 January 1991. This was followed by a ground assault on 23 February. This was a decisive victory for the coalition forces, who liberated Kuwait and advanced into Iraqi territory. The coalition ceased their advance, and declared a cease-fire 100 hours after the ground campaign started. Aerial and ground combat was confined to Iraq, Kuwait, and areas on the border of Saudi Arabia. However, Iraq launched Scud missiles against coalition military targets in Saudi Arabia and against Israel.

Contents

Origins

Throughout much of the Cold War, Iraq had been an ally of the Soviet Union, and there was a history of friction between it and the United States. The U.S. was concerned with Iraq's position on IsraeliPalestinian politics, and its disapproval of the nature of the peace between Israel and Egypt.

The United States also disliked Iraqi support for various Arab and Palestinian militant groups such as Abu Nidal, which led to its inclusion on the developing U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism on 29 December 1979. The U.S. remained officially neutral after the invasion of Iran, which became the Iran–Iraq War, although it assisted Iraq covertly. In March 1982, however, Iran began a successful counteroffensive - Operation Undeniable Victory, and the United States increased its support for Iraq to prevent Iran from forcing a surrender.

In a U.S. bid to open full diplomatic relations with Iraq, the country was removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. Ostensibly this was because of improvement in the regime’s record, although former United States Assistant Secretary of Defense Noel Koch later stated, "No one had any doubts about [the Iraqis'] continued involvement in terrorism... The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran."[18]

With Iraq's new found success in the war, and the Iranian rebuff of a peace offer in July, arms sales to Iraq reached a record spike in 1982. An obstacle, however, remained to any potential U.S.-Iraqi relationship - Abu Nidal continued to operate with official support in Baghdad. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein expelled the group to Syria at the United States' request in November 1983, the Reagan administration sent Donald Rumsfeld to meet President Hussein as a special envoy and to cultivate ties.

Tensions with Kuwait

By the time the ceasefire with Iran was signed in August 1988, Iraq was virtually bankrupt, with most of its debt owed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Iraq pressured both nations to forgive the debts, but they refused. Iraq also accused Kuwait of exceeding its OPEC quotas and driving down the price of oil, thus further hurting the Iraqi economy.

The collapse in oil prices had a catastrophic impact on the Iraqi economy. The Iraqi Government described it as a form of economic warfare, which it claimed was aggravated by Kuwait slant-drilling across the border into Iraq's Rumaila oil field.[19]

Map of Kuwait

The Iraq-Kuwait dispute also involved Iraqi claims to Kuwait as a territory of Iraq. After gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1932, the Iraqi government immediately declared that Kuwait was rightfully a territory of Iraq, as it had been an Iraqi territory for centuries until the British creation of Kuwait after World War I and thus stated that Kuwait was a British imperialist invention.[20] Iraq claimed Kuwait had been a part of the Ottoman Empire's province of Basra. Its ruling dynasty, the al-Sabah family, had concluded a protectorate agreement in 1899 that assigned responsibility for its foreign affairs to Britain. Britain drew the border between the two countries, and deliberately tried to limit Iraq's access to the ocean so that any future Iraqi government would be in no position to threaten Britain's domination of the Persian Gulf. Iraq refused to accept the border, and did not recognize the Kuwaiti government until 1963.[21]

In early July 1990, Iraq complained about Kuwait's behavior, such as not respecting their quota, and openly threatened to take military action. On the 23rd, the CIA reported that Iraq had moved 30,000 troops to the Iraq-Kuwait border, and the U.S. naval fleet in the Persian Gulf was placed on alert. On the 25th, Saddam Hussein met with April Glaspie, an American ambassador, in Baghdad. According to an Iraqi transcript of that meeting, Glaspie told the Iraqi delegation, "We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts." On the 31st, negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait in Jeddah failed violently.[22]

The Invasion of Kuwait

M-84 main battle tanks of the Kuwaiti Armed Forces
Kuwait Air Force A-4KU Skyhawks

On 2 August 1990 Iraq launched the invasion by bombing Kuwait City, the Kuwaiti capital. In spite of Iraqi saber-rattling, Kuwait did not have its forces on alert, and was caught unaware. Iraqi commandos infiltrated the Kuwaiti border first to prepare for the major units which began the attack at the stroke of midnight. The Iraqi attack had two prongs, with the primary attack force driving south straight for Kuwait City down the main highway, and a supporting attack entering Kuwait farther west, but then turning and driving due east, cutting off the capital city from the southern half of the country. The commander of a Kuwaiti armored battalion, 35th Armoured Brigade, deployed them against the Iraqi attack and was able to conduct a robust defense near Al Jahra (see The Battle of the Bridges), west of Kuwait City.[23]

Kuwait Air Force aircraft scrambled to meet the invading force, but approximately 20% were lost or captured. An air battle with the Iraqi helicopter airborne forces was fought over Kuwait City, inflicting heavy losses on the Iraqi elite troops, and a few combat sorties were flown against Iraqi ground forces.[24]

The main Iraqi thrust into Kuwait City was conducted by commandos deployed by helicopters and boats to attack the city from the sea, while other divisions seized the airports and two airbases. The Iraqi's assaulted the Dasman Palace, the Royal Residence of the Emir of Kuwait, Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, which was defended by the Emiri Guard supported with M84 tanks. In the process, the Iraqis killed Sheikh Fahad Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, the Emir of Kuwait's youngest brother.[25]

After two days of intense combat, most of the Kuwaiti Armed Forces were either overrun by the Iraqi Republican Guard, or had escaped to neighboring Saudi Arabia. The emir and key ministers were able to get out and head south along the highway for refuge in Saudi Arabia. Iraqi ground forces consolidated their control on Kuwait City, then headed south and redeployed along the border of Saudi Arabia. After the decisive Iraqi victory, Saddam Hussein installed his cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid (Chemical Ali) as the governor of Kuwait.[25]

Saddam Hussein detained several Westerners, with video footage shown on state television

On 23 August 1990 President Saddam appeared on state television with Western hostages to whom he had refused exit visas. In the video, he patted a small British boy named Stuart Lockwood on the back. Saddam then asks, through his interpreter, Sadoun al-Zubaydi, whether Stuart is getting his milk. Saddam went on to say, "We hope your presence as guests here will not be for too long. Your presence here, and in other places, is meant to prevent the scourge of war."[26]

Pre-Offensive Diplomacy

UN resolution

Within hours of the invasion, Kuwaiti and U.S. delegations requested a meeting of the UN Security Council, which passed Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding a withdrawal of Iraqi troops. On 3 August the Arab League passed its own resolution, which called for a solution to the conflict from within the League, and warned against outside intervention. On 6 August UN Resolution 661 placed economic sanctions on Iraq.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 665 followed soon after, which authorized a naval blockade to enforce the economic sanctions against Iraq. It said the “use of measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary … to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of resolution 661.”[27]

Iraqi Proposals for Withdrawal

President Bush visiting American troops in Saudi Arabia on Thanksgiving Day, 1990.

On 12 August 1990, Saddam Hussein proposed a settlement linking Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait to withdrawal from other illegally occupied Arab lands[28]: Syria from Lebanon, and Israel from the territories it conquered in 1967.[29] On 23 August 1990, a former high-ranking U.S. official delivered another Iraqi proposal to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft; this proposal, confirmed by the emissary who relayed it and by memoranda, finally was made public in an article by Knut Royce in the suburban New York newspaper Newsday on 29 August 1990.[30] According to sources involved and documents, Iraq offered to withdraw from Kuwait and allow foreigners to leave in return for the lifting of sanctions, guaranteed access to the Persian Gulf, and full control of the Rumailah oilfield "that extends slightly into Kuwaiti territory from Iraq" (Royce), about two miles over a disputed border.[31]

Other terms of the proposal, according to memoranda that Royce quotes, were that Iraq and the U.S. negotiate an oil agreement "satisfactory to both nations' national security interests," "jointly work on the stability of the gulf," and develop a joint plan "to alleviate Iraq's economical and financial problems."[32] There was no mention of U.S. withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, or other preconditions. A Bush administration official who specializes in Mideast affairs described the proposal as "serious" and "negotiable."[33](see note 88) [34][35][36]

In late December 1990, Iraq made another proposal, disclosed by U.S. officials on 2 January 1991: an offer "to withdraw from Kuwait if the United States pledges not to attack as soldiers are pulled out, if foreign troops leave the region, and if there is an agreement on the Palestinian problem and on the banning of all weapons of mass destruction in the region."[37] Officials described the offer as "interesting," because it dropped the border issues and "signals Iraqi interest in a negotiated settlement."[38] A State Department Mideast expert described the proposal as a "serious pre-negotiation position.[39]

On 3 January 1991, the New York Times reported, however, that P.L.O. leader Yasser Arafat, after consultations with Saddam Hussein, indicated that neither of them "insisted that the Palestinian problem be solved before Iraqi troops get out of Kuwait"; according to Arafat, "Mr. Hussein's statement Aug. 12, linking an Iraqi withdrawal to an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, was no longer operative as a negotiating demand," all that was necessary was "a strong link to be guaranteed by the five permanent members of the Security Council that we have to solve all the problems in the Gulf, in the Middle East and especially the Palestinian cause."[40]

According to Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, "The Administration's rapid rejection of the Iraqi proposal for opening a diplomatic track [grew] out of Washington's concern that should it become involved in negotiations about the terms of an Iraqi withdrawal, America's Arab allies might feel under pressure to give the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, a few token gains in Kuwait to roll back his invasion and defuse the crisis."[41]

UN Diplomacy

On 14 January 1991, France proposed that the U.N. Security Council call for "a rapid and massive withdrawal" from Kuwait along with a statement to Iraq that Council members would bring their "active contribution" to a settlement of other problems of the region, "in particular, of the Arab-Israeli conflict and in particular to the Palestinian problem by convening, at an appropriate moment, an international conference" to assure "the security, stability and development of this region of the world." The French proposal was supported by Belgium (at the moment one of the rotating Security Council members), and Germany, Spain, Italy, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and several non-aligned nations. The U.S. and Britain rejected it (along with the Soviet Union, irrelevantly). American U.N. Ambassador Thomas Pickering stated that the French proposal was unacceptable, because it went beyond previous U.N. Security Council resolutions on the Iraqi invasion.[42][43][44]

Operation Desert Shield

F-15Es parked during Operation Desert Shield.

One of the main concerns of the west was the significant threat Iraq posed to Saudi Arabia. Following the conquest of Kuwait, the Iraqi army was within easy striking distance of Saudi oil fields. Control of these fields, along with Kuwaiti and Iraqi reserves, would have given Hussein control over the majority of the world's oil reserves. Iraq also had a number of grievances with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had lent Iraq some 26 billion dollars during its war with Iran. The Saudis backed Iraq, as they feared the influence of Shia Iran's Islamic revolution on its own Shia minority (most of the Saudi oil fields are in territory populated by Shias). After the war, Saddam felt he should not have to repay the loans due to the help he had given the Saudis by stopping Iran.

Soon after his conquest of Kuwait, Hussein began verbally attacking the Saudi kingdom. He argued that the U.S.-supported Saudi state was an illegitimate and unworthy guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. He combined the language of the Islamist groups that had recently fought in Afghanistan with the rhetoric Iran had long used to attack the Saudis.[45]

Acting on the policy of the Carter Doctrine, and out of fear the Iraqi army could launch an invasion of Saudi Arabia, U.S. President George H. W. Bush quickly announced that the U.S. would launch a "wholly defensive" mission to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia under the codename Operation Desert Shield. Operation Desert Shield began on 7 August 1990 when U.S. troops were sent to Saudi Arabia due also to the request of its monarch, King Fahd, who had earlier called for U.S. military assistance.[46] This "wholly defensive" doctrine was quickly abandoned when, on 8 August, Iraq declared Kuwait to be the 19th province of Iraq and Saddam Hussein named his cousin, Ali Hassan Al-Majid as its military-governor.[47]

The United States Navy mobilized two naval battle groups, the aircraft carriers USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, USS Independence and their escorts, to the area, where they were ready by 8 August. A total of 48 U.S. Air Force F-15s from the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, landed in Saudi Arabia, and immediately commenced round the clock air patrols of the Saudi–Kuwait–Iraq border areas to discourage further Iraqi military advances. The U.S. also sent the battleships USS Missouri and USS Wisconsin to the region. Military buildup continued from there, eventually reaching 543,000 troops, twice the number used in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Much of the material was airlifted or carried to the staging areas via fast sealift ships, allowing a quick buildup.

Creating a coalition

A series of UN Security Council resolutions and Arab League resolutions were passed regarding the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. One of the most important was Resolution 678, passed on 29 November 1990, which gave Iraq a withdrawal deadline until 15 January 1991, and authorized “all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660,” and a diplomatic formulation authorizing the use of force if Iraq failed to comply.[48]

The United States assembled a coalition of forces to join it in opposing Iraq's aggression, consisting of forces from 34 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States itself.[49]

Although they did not contribute any forces, Japan and Germany made financial contributions totaling $10 billion and $6.6 billion respectively. U.S. troops represented 73% of the coalition’s 956,600 troops in Iraq.

Many of the coalition forces were reluctant to join. Some felt that the war was an internal Arab affair, or did not want to increase U.S. influence in the Middle East. In the end, however, many nations were persuaded by Iraq’s belligerence towards other Arab states, offers of economic aid or debt forgiveness, and threats to withhold aid.[50]

Reasons and campaign for intervention

Cheney meets with Prince Sultan, Minister of Defence and Aviation in Saudi Arabia to discuss how to handle the invasion of Kuwait

The United States and the United Nations gave several public justifications for involvement in the conflict, the most prominent being the Iraqi violation of Kuwaiti territorial integrity. In addition, the United States moved to support its ally Saudi Arabia, whose importance in the region, and as a key supplier of oil, made it of considerable geopolitical importance. Shortly after the Iraqi invasion, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney made the first of several visits to Saudi Arabia where King Fahd requested US military assistance. During a speech in a special joint session of the U.S. Congress given on 11 September 1990, U.S. President George H.W. Bush summed up the reasons with the following remarks: "Within three days, 120,000 Iraqi troops with 850 tanks had poured into Kuwait and moved south to threaten Saudi Arabia. It was then that I decided to act to check that aggression."[51]

Gen. Schwarzkopf, Gen. Colin Powell (left), and Paul Wolfowitz (right) listen as Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney addresses reporters regarding the 1991 Gulf War.

The Pentagon claimed that satellite photos showing a buildup of Iraqi forces along the border were the source of this information, but this was later shown to be false. A reporter for the Saint Petersburg Times acquired commercial satellite images made at the time in question, which showed nothing but empty desert.[52]

Other justifications for foreign involvement included Iraq’s history of human rights abuses under President Saddam. Iraq was also known to possess biological weapons and chemical weapons, which Saddam had used against Iranian troops during the Iran–Iraq War and against his own country's Kurdish population in the Al-Anfal Campaign. Iraq was also known to have a nuclear weapons program.

Although there were human rights abuses committed in Kuwait by the invading Iraqi military, the ones best known in the U.S. were inventions of the public relations firm hired by the government of Kuwait to influence U.S. opinion in favor of military intervention. Shortly after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the organisation Citizens for a Free Kuwait was formed in the U.S. It hired the public relations firm Hill & Knowlton for about $11 million, paid by the Kuwaiti government.[53]

Among many other means of influencing U.S. opinion (distributing books on Iraqi atrocities to U.S. soldiers deployed in the region, 'Free Kuwait' T-shirts and speakers to college campuses, and dozens of video news releases to television stations), the firm arranged for an appearance before a group of members of the U.S. Congress in which a woman identifying herself as a nurse working in the Kuwait City hospital described Iraqi soldiers pulling babies out of incubators and letting them die on the floor.

The story was an influence in tipping both the public and Congress towards a war with Iraq: six Congressmen said the testimony was enough for them to support military action against Iraq and seven Senators referenced the testimony in debate. The Senate supported the military actions in a 52-47 vote. A year after the war, however, this allegation was revealed to be a fabrication. The woman who had testified was found to be a member of the Kuwaiti Royal Family, in fact the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the U.S.[54] She had not been living in Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion.

The details of the Hill & Knowlton public relations campaign, including the incubator testimony, were published in a John R. MacArthur's Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War (Berkeley, CA: University of CA Press, 1992), and came to wide public attention when an Op-ed by MacArthur was published in the New York Times. This prompted a reexamination by Amnesty International, which had originally promoted an account alleging even greater numbers of babies torn from incubators than the original fake testimony. After finding no evidence to support it, the organization issued a retraction. President George H. W. Bush then repeated the incubator allegations on television.

At the same time, the Iraqi army committed several well-documented crimes during its occupation of Kuwait, such as the summary execution without trial of three brothers after which their bodies were stacked in a pile and left to decay in a public street.[55] Iraqi troops also ransacked and looted private Kuwaiti homes, one residence was repeatedly defecated in.[56] A resident later commented, "The whole thing was violence for the sake of violence, destruction for the sake of destruction... Imagine a surrealistic painting by Salvador Dalí".[57]

Early battles

Air campaign

An F-14A Tomcat from VF-32 and two EA-6B Prowlers during Desert Storm.
An Iraqi T-54A or Type 59 tank lies in ruins in the aftermath of an Allied bombing attack during Operation Desert Storm.
USAF A-10A Thunderbolt-II ground attack plane over circles of irrigated crops during Desert Storm.

The Persian Gulf War started with an extensive aerial bombing campaign on 17 January 1991. The coalition flew over 100,000 sorties, dropping 88,500 tons of bombs,[58] and widely destroying military and civilian infrastructure.[59] The air campaign was commanded by USAF Lieutenant General Chuck Horner, who briefly served as Commander-in-Chief - Forward of U.S. Central Command while General Schwarzkopf was still in the United States.

A day after the deadline set in Resolution 678, the coalition launched a massive air campaign, which began the general offensive codenamed Operation Desert Storm. The first priority for Coalition forces was the destruction of the Iraqi air force and anti-aircraft facilities. The sorties were launched mostly from Saudi Arabia and the six Coalition aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBG) in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea.

The next coalition targets were command and communication facilities. Saddam Hussein had closely micromanaged the Iraqi forces in the Iran–Iraq War, and initiative at lower levels was discouraged. Coalition planners hoped that Iraqi resistance would quickly collapse if deprived of command and control.

The third and largest phase of the air campaign targeted military targets throughout Iraq and Kuwait: Scud missile launchers, weapons research facilities, and naval forces. About one-third of the Coalition airpower was devoted to attacking scuds, some of which were on trucks and therefore difficult to locate. Some U.S. and British special forces teams had been covertly inserted into western Iraq to aid in the search and destruction of Scuds.

Iraqi antiaircraft defenses, including MANPADs, were surprisingly ineffective against coalition aircraft and the coalition suffered only 75 aircraft losses in over 100,000 sorties, 44 of which were the result of Iraqi action. Two of these losses are the result of aircraft colliding with the ground while evading Iraqi ground fired weapons.[60][61] One of these losses is a confirmed air-air victory.[62]

Iraq launches missile strikes

Scud Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) with missile in upright position.
Military personnel examine the tail section of a scud missile shot down by a Patriot Missile during Operation Desert Storm 1991.

The Iraqi government made no secret that it would attack Israel if invaded. Prior to the start of the war, Tariq Aziz, Iraq's English-speaking Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, was asked in the aftermath of the failed U.S.-Iraq peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland by a reporter. “Mr. Foreign Minister, if war starts...will you attack Israel?” the reporter asked. His response was, “Yes, absolutely, yes.”[63][64]

Five hours after the first attacks, Iraq's state radio broadcast a voice identified as Saddam Hussein declaring that "The great duel, the mother of all battles has begun. The dawn of victory nears as this great showdown begins." Iraq responded by launching eight Al Hussein missiles into Israel the next day. These missile attacks on Israel were to continue throughout the six weeks of the war.

The Iraqis hoped that they would provoke a military response from Israel. It was expected that many Arab nations would withdraw from the coalition, as they would be reluctant to fight alongside Israel. Israel, at the request of the United States, did not launch counterstrikes, and all Arab states remained in the coalition. The potency of the Scud missiles was felt in the Dhahran missile attack, which killed 28 U.S. soldiers.

The Scud missiles targeting Israel were relatively ineffective, as firing at extreme range resulted in a dramatic reduction in accuracy and payload.

Israeli civilians taking shelter from rockets

Two Israeli civilians died from these attacks, and approximately 230 were injured. Of the reported injuries, 10 were considered moderate injuries, while one was considered a severe injury.[10] Several others suffered fatal heart attacks immediately following the missile strikes. Extensive property damage was also caused. It was also feared that Iraq would fire missiles filled with nerve agents or sarin. As a result, the Israeli government issued gas masks to its citizens. When the first Iraqi missiles hit Tel Aviv, some people injected themselves with an antidote for nerve gas. Israel was ready to respond with military force to these attacks, but agreed when asked not to by the U.S. Government, who feared that if Israel became involved, the other Arab nations would either desert from the coalition or join Iraq. It was also feared that if the Israeli Air Force used Syrian or Jordanian airspace to attack Iraq, then they would intervene in the war on Iraq's side or attack Israel. Israeli policy for the previous forty years had always been retaliation, but Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir showed restraint and agreed not to retaliate in response to requests from the United States to remain out of the conflict.[65]

Israel was given two batteries of MIM-104 Patriot missiles for the protection of civilians.[66] Allied air forces were also extensively exercised in "Scud hunts" in the Iraqi desert, trying to locate the camouflaged trucks before they fired their missiles at Israel or Saudi Arabia.

The Royal Netherlands Air Force also deployed Patriot missiles in both Turkey and Israel to counter the Scud threat. The Dutch Ministry of Defense later stated that the military use of the Patriot missile system was largely ineffective, but its psychological value was high.[67] It has been suggested that the sturdy construction techniques used in Israeli cities, coupled with the fact that Scuds were only launched at night, played an important role in limiting the number deaths and injuries from Scud attacks.[10]

Three Scud missiles and a coalition Patriot that malfunctioned hit Ramat Gan in Israel on 22 January 1991, injuring 96 people, and possibly causing the deaths of three elderly people who died of heart attacks.

Forty-two Scud missiles were fired by Iraq into Israel during the seven weeks of the war.[68] In addition, 44 Scud missiles were fired into Saudi Arabia, and one missile was fired at Bahrain and another at Qatar. The missiles were fired at both military and civilian targets. One Saudi civilian was killed, and 65 others were injured. No injuries were reported in Bahrain or Qatar.

On 25 February 1991, a Scud missile hit a U.S. Army barracks of the 14th Quartermaster Detachment, out of Greensburg, PA, stationed in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia killing 28 soldiers and injuring over 100.[11]

Battle of Khafji

Military operations during liberation of Khafji

On 29 January Iraqi forces attacked and occupied the lightly defended Saudi city of Khafji with tanks and infantry. The Battle of Khafji ended two days later when the Iraqis were driven back by the Saudi Arabian National Guard and the United States Marine Corps, supported by Qatari forces. The allied forces provided close air support and used extensive artillery fire.

Casualties were heavy on both sides, although Iraqi forces sustained substantially more dead and captured than the allied forces. Eleven Americans were killed in two separate friendly fire incidents, an additional 14 U.S. airmen were killed when an American AC-130 gunship was shot down by an Iraqi SAM missile, and two American soldiers were captured during the battle. Saudi and Qatari forces had a total of 18 dead. Iraqi forces in Khafji had 60–300 dead and 400 captured.

Khafji was a strategically important city immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Iraqi reluctance to commit several armored divisions to the occupation, and its subsequent use of Khafji as a launching pad into the initially lightly defended east of Saudi Arabia is considered by many academics a grave strategic error. Not only would Iraq have secured a majority of Middle Eastern oil supplies, but it would have found itself better able to threaten the subsequent U.S. deployment along superior defensive lines.

Ground campaign

Ground troop movements 24–28 February 1991 during Operation Desert Storm.

The Coalition forces dominated the air with their technological advantages, but the ground forces were considered to be more evenly matched. Coalition forces had the significant advantage of being able to operate under the protection of air supremacy that had been achieved by their air forces before the start of the main ground offensive. Coalition forces also had two key technological advantages:

  1. The Coalition main battle tanks, such as the U.S. M1 Abrams, British Challenger 1, and Kuwaiti M-84AB were vastly superior to the Chinese Type 69 and domestically built T-72 tanks used by the Iraqis, with crews better trained and armoured doctrine better developed.
  2. The use of GPS made it possible for Coalition forces to navigate without reference to roads or other fixed landmarks. This, along with air reconnaissance, allowed them to fight a battle of maneuver rather than a battle of encounter: they knew where they were and where the enemy was, so they could attack a specific target rather than searching on the ground for enemy forces.
Two Iraqi tanks lie abandoned near Kuwait City on 26 February 1991.

Liberation of Kuwait

Marines from Company D, 2nd Tank Battalion, drive their M60A1 main battle tank fitted with reactive armor and an M-9 bulldozer kit, during a breach exercise in Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
US tanks from the 3rd Armored Division along the Line of Departure.
Iraqi Type 69 tank on the road into Kuwait City during the Gulf War.

American decoy attacks by air attacks and naval gunfire the night before the liberation of Kuwait were designed to make the Iraqis believe the main coalition ground attack would focus on Central Kuwait.

For months, American units in Saudi Arabia had been under almost constant Iraqi artillery fire, as well as threats from Scud missile or chemical attacks. On 23 February 1991, the 1st Marine Division, 2nd Marine Division, and the 1st Light Armored Infantry crossed into Kuwait and headed toward Kuwait City. They encountered trenches, barbed wire, and minefields. However, these positions were poorly defended, and were overrun in the first few hours. Several tank battles took place, but apart from that, Coalition troops encountered minimal resistance, as most Iraqi troops surrendered. The general pattern was that the Iraqis would put up a short fight before surrendering. However, Iraqi air defenses shot down nine American aircraft. Meanwhile, forces from Arab countries advanced into Kuwait from the east, encountering little resistance and suffering few casualties.

Despite the successes of Coalition forces, it was feared that the Republican Guard would escape into Iraq before it could be destroyed. It was decided to send British armored forces into Kuwait fifteen hours ahead of schedule, and to send American forces after the Republican Guard. The Coalition advance was preceded by a heavy artillery and rocket barrage, after which 150,000 troops and 1,500 tanks began their advance. Iraqi forces in Kuwait counterattacked against U.S. troops, acting on a direct order from Saddam himself. Despite the intense combat, the Americans repulsed the Iraqis and continued to advance towards Kuwait city.

Kuwaiti forces were tasked with liberating the city. Iraqi troops offered only light resistance. The Kuwaitis lost one soldier killed and one plane shot down, and quickly liberated the city. On 27 February, Saddam ordered a retreat from Kuwait. However, an Iraqi unit at Kuwait International Airport appeared not to have gotten the message, and fiercely resisted. U.S. Marines had to fight for hours before securing the airport, after which Kuwait was declared secure. After four days of fighting, Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait. As part of a scorched-earth policy, they set fire to nearly 700 oil wells, and placed land mines around the wells to make extinguishing the fires more difficult.

Initial moves into Iraq

Iraqi Tank knocked out by 3rd Armored Division fire.

The ground phase of the war was given the official designation Operation Desert Sabre.[69]

The first units to move into Iraq were three patrols of the B squadron of the British Special Air Service, call signs Bravo One Zero, Bravo Two Zero, and Bravo Three Zero, in late January. These eight-man patrols landed behind Iraqi lines to gather intelligence on the movements of Scud mobile missile launchers, which could not be detected from the air, as they were hidden under bridges and camouflage netting during the day. Other objectives included the destruction of the launchers and their fiber-optic communications arrays that lay in pipelines and relayed coordinates to the TEL operators that were launching attacks against Israel. The operations were designed to prevent any possible Israeli intervention.

Elements of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division of the U.S. Army performed a covert Reconnaissance into Iraq on 9 February 1991, followed by one in force on 20 February that destroyed an Iraqi regiment. From 15–20 February, the Battle of Wadi Al-Batin took place inside Iraq. It was a feint attack, designed to make the Iraqis think that a coalition invasion would take place from the south. The Iraqis fiercely resisted, and the Americans eventually withdrew. Three American soldiers were killed and nine wounded as well as several tanks and armored vehicles destroyed or damaged, but they had taken seven prisoners and destroyed five tanks and twenty prisoners, and successfully deceived the Iraqis. On 22 February 1991, Iraq agreed to a Soviet-proposed cease-fire agreement. The agreement called for Iraq to withdraw troops to pre-invasion positions within six weeks following a total cease-fire, and called for monitoring of the cease-fire and withdrawal to be overseen by the UN Security Council.

The Coalition rejected the proposal, but said that retreating Iraqi forces would not be attacked, and gave twenty-four hours for Iraq to begin withdrawing forces. On 23 February, fighting resulted in the capture of 500 Iraqi soldiers. On 24 February, British and American armoured forces crossed the Iraq/Kuwait border and entered Iraq in large numbers, taking hundreds of prisoners. Iraqi resistance was light, and 4 Americans were killed.[70]

Coalition forces enter Iraq

Destroyed Iraqi civilian and military vehicles on the Highway of Death.
An Iraqi T-55 tank, lies among other wreckage along the Highway of Death in April 1991.
Aerial view of destroyed Iraqi T-72 tank, BMP-1 and Type 63 armored personnel carriers and trucks on Highway 8 in March 1991

Shortly afterwards, the U.S. VII Corps in full strength and, spearheaded by the 3rd Squadron of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3/2 ACR), launched an armored attack into Iraq early on 24 February, just to the west of Kuwait, taking Iraqi forces by surprise. Simultaneously, the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps launched a sweeping “left-hook” attack across the largely undefended desert of southern Iraq, led by the 3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment (3rd ACR) and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The left flank of this movement was protected by the French 6th Light Armoured Division Daguet.

The French force quickly overcame the Iraqi 45th Infantry Division, suffering light casualties and taking a large number of prisoners, and took up blocking positions to prevent an Iraqi counter-attack on the Coalition flank. The right flank of the movement was protected by the British 1st Armoured Division. Once the allies had penetrated deep into Iraqi territory, they turned eastward, launching a flank attack against the elite Republican Guard before it could escape. The Iraqis resisted fiercly from dug-in positions and stationary vehicles, and even mounted armored charges.

The oil fires caused were a result of the scorched earth policy of Iraqi military forces retreating from Kuwait

Unlike many previous engagements, the destruction of the first Iraqi tanks did not result in a mass surrender. The Iraqis suffered massive losses and lost dozens of tanks and vehicles, while American casualties were comparatively low, with a single Bradley knocked out. Coalition forces pressed another ten kilometers into Iraqi territory, and captured their objective within three hours. They took 500 prisoners and inflicted heavy losses, decimating the Iraqi 26th Infantry Division. An American soldier was killed by an Iraqi land mine, another five by friendly fire, and thirty wounded during the battle. American forces breached Iraqi defenses and decimated an entire Iraqi infantry division. Meanwhile, British forces attacked the Iraqi Medina Division and a major Republican Guard logistics base. In nearly two days of some of the war's most intense fighting, the British destroyed 40 enemy tanks and captured a division commander.

Meanwhile, American forces attacked the village of Al Busayyah, meeting fierce resistance. They suffered no casualties, but destroyed a considerable amount of military hardware and took prisoners.

On 25 February 1991, Iraqi forces fired a scud missile at an American barracks in Dharan, Saudi Arabia. The missile attack killed 28 American military personnel.[71]

The Coalition advance was much swifter than U.S. generals had expected. On 26 February, Iraqi troops began retreating from Kuwait, after they had set its oil fields on fire (737 oil wells were set on fire). A long convoy of retreating Iraqi troops formed along the main Iraq-Kuwait highway. Although they were retreating, this convoy was bombed so extensively by Coalition air forces that it came to be known as the Highway of Death. Hundreds of Iraqi troops were killed. Forces from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France continued to pursue retreating Iraqi forces over the border and back into Iraq, eventually moving to within 150 miles (240 km) of Baghdad before withdrawing from the Iraqi border.

One hundred hours after the ground campaign started, on 28 February, President Bush declared a cease-fire, and he also declared that Kuwait had been liberated.

Post-war military analysis

Although it was said in Western media at the time that Iraqi troops numbered approximately 545,000 to 600,000, most experts today believe that both the qualitative and quantitative descriptions of the Iraqi army at the time were exaggerated, as they included both temporary and auxiliary support elements. Many of the Iraqi troops were young, under-resourced, and poorly trained conscripts.

The Coalition committed 540,000 troops, and a further 100,000 Turkish troops were deployed along the Turkish-Iraqi border. This caused a significant force dilution of the Iraqi military by forcing it to deploy its forces along all its borders. This allowed the main thrust by the U.S. to possess not only a significant technological advantage, but also a numerical superiority.

The widespread support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war equipped Iraq with military equipment from most major world arms dealers. This resulted in a lack of standardization in this large heterogeneous force, which additionally suffered from poor training and poor motivation. The majority of Iraqi armored forces still used old Chinese Type 59s and Type 69s, Soviet-made T-55s from the 1950s and 1960s, and some poor quality Asad Babil tanks (domestically assembled tank based on Polish T-72 hulls with other parts of mixed origin). These machines were not equipped with up-to-date equipment, such as thermal sights or laser rangefinders, and their effectiveness in modern combat was very limited.

The Iraqis failed to find an effective countermeasure to the thermal sights and sabot rounds used by the Coalition tanks. This equipment enabled them to engage and destroy Iraqi tanks from more than three times the range that Iraqi tanks could engage coalition tanks. The Iraqi crews used old, cheap steel penetrators against the advanced Chobham Armour of the U.S. and British tanks, with ineffective results. The Iraqis also failed to utilize the advantage that could be gained from using urban warfare—fighting within Kuwait City— which could have inflicted significant casualties on the attacking forces. Urban combat reduces the range at which fighting occurs, and can negate some of the technological advantages of well-equipped forces.

The Iraqis also tried to use Soviet military doctrine, but the implementation failed due to the lack of skill of their commanders, and the preventive coalition air strikes on communication centers and bunkers.

The end of active hostilities

Civilians and coalition military forces wave Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian flags as they celebrate the retreat of Iraqi forces from Kuwait as a result of Operation Desert Storm

In Iraqi territory that was occupied by the coalition, a peace conference was held where a cease fire agreement was negotiated and signed by both sides. At the conference, Iraq was approved to fly armed helicopters on their side of the temporary border, ostensibly for government transit due to the damage done to civilian infrastructure. Soon after, these helicopters and much of the Iraqi armed forces were used to fight a Shi'ite uprising in the south. The rebellions were encouraged by an airing of "The Voice of Free Iraq" on 2 February 1991, which was broadcast from a CIA run radio station out of Saudi Arabia. The Arabic service of the Voice of America supported the uprising by stating that the rebellion was large, and that they soon would be liberated from Saddam.[72]

In the North, Kurdish leaders took American statements that they would support an uprising to heart, and began fighting, hoping to trigger a coup d'état. However, when no American support came, Iraqi generals remained loyal to Saddam and brutally crushed the Kurdish uprising. Millions of Kurds fled across the mountains to Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iran. These events later resulted in no-fly zones being established in both the North and the South of Iraq. In Kuwait, the Emir was restored, and suspected Iraqi collaborators were repressed. Eventually, over 400,000 people were expelled from the country, including a large number of Palestinians, due to PLO support of Saddam Hussein. The PLO would formally apologize for its support of Iraq in 2004.[73]

There was some criticism of the Bush administration, as they chose to allow Saddam Hussein to remain in power instead of pushing on to capture Baghdad and overthrowing his government. In their co-written 1998 book, A World Transformed, Bush and Brent Scowcroft argued that such a course would have fractured the alliance, and would have had many unnecessary political and human costs associated with it.

In 1992, the United States Secretary of Defense during the war, Dick Cheney, made the same point:

“I would guess if we had gone in there, we would still have forces in Baghdad today. We'd be running the country. We would not have been able to get everybody out and bring everybody home.

And the final point that I think needs to be made is this question of casualties. I don't think you could have done all of that without significant additional U.S. casualties, and while everybody was tremendously impressed with the low cost of the (1991) conflict, for the 146 Americans who were killed in action and for their families, it wasn't a cheap war. And the question in my mind is, how many additional American casualties is Saddam (Hussein) worth? And the answer is, not that damned many. So, I think we got it right, both when we decided to expel him from Kuwait, but also when the President made the decision that we'd achieved our objectives and we were not going to go get bogged down in the problems of trying to take over and govern Iraq.”[74]

Instead of a greater involvement of its own military, the United States hoped that Saddam Hussein would be overthrown in an internal coup d'état. The Central Intelligence Agency used its assets in Iraq to organize a revolt, but the Iraqi government defeated the effort.

On 10 March 1991, 540,000 American troops began to move out of the Persian Gulf.

Coalition involvement

Coalition troops from Egypt, Syria, Oman and Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm.
British Army Challenger 1 main battle tank during Operation Desert Storm.
French and American soldiers inspecting an Iraqi Type 69 tank destroyed by the French 6th Light Armored Division during Operation Desert Storm.
A fighter jet taking off from a runway
Canadian CF-18 Hornets participated in combat during the Gulf War.
HMAS Sydney in the Persian Gulf in 1991.

Members of the Coalition included Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States of America.[75]

Germany and Japan provided financial assistance and donated military hardware, but did not send direct military assistance. This later became known as checkbook diplomacy.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom committed the largest contingent of any European nation that participated in the combat operations of the war. Operation Granby was the codename for the operations in the Persian Gulf. British Army regiments (mainly with the British 1st Armoured Division), Royal Air Force squadrons and Royal Navy vessels were mobilized in the Gulf. The Royal Air Force, using various aircraft, operated from airbases in Saudi Arabia. Almost 2,500 armoured vehicles and 43,000 troops[75] were shipped for action.

Chief Royal Navy vessels deployed to the gulf included a number of Broadsword-class frigates, and Sheffield-class destroyers, other RN and RFA ships were also deployed. The light aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal was not deployed to the Gulf area, but was deployed to the Mediterranean Sea.

France

The second largest European contingent was France, which committed 18,000 troops.[75] Operating on the left flank of the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps, the main French army force was the 6th Light Armoured Division, including troops from the French Foreign Legion. Initially, the French operated independently under national command and control, but coordinated closely with the Americans, Saudis and CENTCOM. In January, the Division was placed under the tactical control of the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps. France also deployed several combat aircraft and naval units. The French called their contribution Opération Daguet.

Canada

Canada was one of the first nations to condemn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and it quickly agreed to join the U.S.-led coalition. In August 1990, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney committed the Canadian Forces to deploy the destroyers HMCS Terra Nova and HMCS Athabaskan to join the maritime interdiction force. The supply ship HMCS Protecteur was also sent to aid the gathering coalition logistics forces in the Persian Gulf. A fourth ship, HMCS Huron, arrived in-theater after hostilities had ceased and visited Kuwait.

Following the UN authorized use of force against Iraq, the Canadian Forces deployed a CF-18 Hornet squadron with support personnel, as well as a field hospital to deal with casualties from the ground war. When the air war began, Canada's CF-18s were integrated into the coalition force and were tasked with providing air cover and attacking ground targets. This was the first time since the Korean War that the Canadian military had participated in offensive combat operations.

Australia

Australia contributed a Naval Task Group, which formed part of the multi-national fleet in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, under Operation Damask. In addition, medical teams were deployed aboard a U.S. hospital ship, and a naval clearance diving team took part in de-mining Kuwait’s port facilities following the end of combat operations.

Australia was a member of the international coalition which contributed military forces to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. While the Australian forces did not see combat, they did play a significant role in enforcing the sanctions put in place against Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait, as well as other small support contributions to Operation Desert Storm. Following the end of the Persian Gulf War, Australia deployed a medical unit on Operation Habitat to northern Iraq as part of Operation Provide Comfort.

Casualties

Civilian

The increased importance of air attacks from both warplanes and cruise missiles led to much controversy over the number of civilian deaths caused during the initial stages of the war. Within the first 24 hours of the war, more than 1,000 sorties were flown, many against targets in Baghdad. The city was the target of heavy bombing, as it was the seat of power for President Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi forces' command and control. This ultimately led to substantial civilian casualties.

During the bombing campaign prior to the ground war, many aerial attacks led to civilian casualties. In one particularly notable incident, stealth planes bombed a bunker in Amirya, causing the deaths of 200-400 civilians, who were taking refuge there at the time. Scenes of burned and mutilated bodies were subsequently broadcast, and controversy raged over the status of the bunker, with some stating that it was a civilian shelter, while others contended that it was a center of Iraqi military operations, and that the civilians had been deliberately moved there to act as human shields.

An investigation by Beth Osborne Daponte estimated civilian fatalities at about 3,500 from bombing, and some 100,000 from other effects of the war.[76][77][78]

Iraqi

The exact number of Iraqi combat casualties is unknown, but it is believed to have been heavy. Some estimate that Iraq sustained between 20,000 and 35,000 fatalities.[76] A report commissioned by the U.S. Air Force, estimated 10,000-12,000 Iraqi combat deaths in the air campaign, and as many as 10,000 casualties in the ground war.[79] This analysis is based on Iraqi prisoner of war reports.

Saddam Hussein's government gave high civilian casualty figures in order to draw support from the Islamic countries. The Iraqi government claimed that 2,300 civilians died during the air campaign. According to the Project on Defense Alternatives study, 3,664 Iraqi civilians, and between 20,000 and 26,000 military personnel, were killed in the conflict, while 75,000 Iraqi soldiers were wounded.[80]

Coalition

Patriot missile launch.

The DoD reports that U.S. forces suffered 148 battle-related deaths (35 to friendly fire), with one pilot listed as MIA (his remains were found and identified in August 2009). A further 145 Americans died in non-combat accidents.[81] The UK suffered 47 deaths (9 to friendly fire), France two, and the Arab countries, not including Kuwait, suffered 37 deaths (18 Saudis, 10 Egyptians, 6 UAE, and 3 Syrians).[81] At least 605 Kuwaiti soldiers were still missing 10 years after their capture.[82]

The largest single loss of life among Coalition forces happened on 25 February 1991, when an Iraqi Al-Hussein missile hit an American military barrack in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 U.S. Army Reservists from Pennsylvania. In all, 190 coalition troops were killed by Iraqi fire during the war, 113 of whom were American, out of a total of 358 coalition deaths. Another 44 soldiers were killed, and 57 wounded, by friendly fire. 145 soldiers died of exploding munitions, or non-combat accidents.

The number of coalition wounded in combat seems to have been 776, including 458 Americans.[83]

However, as of the year 2000, 183,000 U.S. veterans of the Gulf War, more than a quarter of the U.S. troops who participated in War, have been declared permanently disabled by the Department of Veterans Affairs.[84][85] About 30% of the 700,000 men and women who served in U.S. forces during the Gulf War still suffer an array of serious symptoms whose causes are not fully understood.[86]

A column of M-113 APCs and other military vehicles of the Royal Saudi Land Force travels along a channel cleared of mines during Operation Desert Storm, Kuwait, 1 March 1991.

190 Coalition troops were killed by Iraqi combatants, the rest of the 379 coalition deaths being from friendly fire or accidents. This number was much lower than expected. Among the American dead were three female soldiers.

This is a list of Coalition troops killed by country.

United States United States - 294 (114 by enemy fire, 145 in accidents, 35 to friendly fire)
United Kingdom United Kingdom - 47 (38 by enemy fire, 9 to friendly fire)
Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia - 18[87]
Egypt Egypt - 11[88]
United Arab Emirates United Arab Emirates - 6[89]
Syria Syria - 2[90]
France France - 2
Kuwait Kuwait - 1 (as part of Operation Desert Storm)[91]

Friendly fire

While the death toll among Coalition forces engaging Iraqi combatants was very low, a substantial number of deaths were caused by accidental attacks from other allied units. Of the 148 American troops who died in battle, 24% were killed by friendly fire, a total of 35 service personnel. A further 11 died in detonations of allied munitions. Nine British service personnel were killed in a friendly fire incident when a United States Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt II attacked a group of two Warrior IFVs.

Gulf War controversies

Gulf War Illness

Many returning coalition soldiers reported illnesses following their participation in the Gulf War, a phenomenon known as Gulf War syndrome or Gulf War illness. There has been widespread speculation and disagreement about the causes of the illness and the reported birth defects. Some factors considered as possibilities include exposure to depleted uranium, chemical weapons, anthrax vaccines given to deploying soldiers, and/or infectious diseases. Major Michael Donnelly, a former USAF officer during the Gulf War, helped publicize the syndrome and advocated for veterans' rights in this regard.

Effects of depleted uranium

Approximate area and major clashes in which DU rounds were used.

Depleted uranium (DU) was used in the Gulf War in tank kinetic energy penetrators and 20–30 mm cannon ordnance. DU is a pyrophoric, genotoxic, and teratogenic heavy metal. Many have cited its use during the Gulf War as a contributing factor to a number of instances of health issues in both veterans of the conflict and surrounding civilian populations. However, scientific opinion on the risk is mixed.[92][93][94]

Highway of Death

On the night of 26–27 February 1991, some defeated Iraqi forces began leaving Kuwait on the main highway north of Al Jahra in a column of some 1,400 vehicles. A patrolling E-8 Joint STARS aircraft observed the retreating forces and relayed the information to the DDM-8 air operations center in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.[95] These vehicles and the retreating soldiers were subsequently attacked, resulting in a 60 km stretch of highway strewn with debris—the Highway of Death.

Bulldozer assault

Another incident during the war highlighted the question of large-scale Iraqi combat deaths. This was the “bulldozer assault”, wherein two brigades from the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) were faced with a large and complex trench network, as part of the heavily fortified "Saddam Hussein Line." After some deliberation, they opted to use anti-mine plows mounted on tanks and combat earthmovers to simply plow over and bury alive the defending Iraqi soldiers. One newspaper story reported that the U.S. commanders estimated thousands of Iraqi soldiers surrendered, escaping live burial during the two-day assault 24–25 February 1991. Patrick Day Sloyan of Newsday reported, "Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Vulcan armored carriers straddled the trench lines and fired into the Iraqi soldiers as the tanks covered them with mounds of sand. 'I came through right after the lead company,' [Col. Anthony] Moreno said. 'What you saw was a bunch of buried trenches with peoples' arms and things sticking out of them. . .'" [96] However, after the war, the Iraqi government claimed to have found only 44 bodies.[97] In his book The Wars Against Saddam, John Simpson alleges that U.S. forces attempted to cover up this incident.[98]

Killing of unarmed Iraqi Soldiers

At the March-April 1991 European Parliament hearings on the Gulf War, Mike Erlich of the Military Counseling Network stated: "Hundreds, possibly thousands, of Iraqi soldiers began walking toward the U.S. position unarmed, with their arms raised in an attempt to surrender. However, the orders for this unit were not to take any prisoners. . . . The commander of the unit began the firing by shooting an anti-tank missile through one of the Iraqi soldiers. This is a missile designed to destroy tanks, but it was used against one man. At that point, everybody in the unit began shooting...quite simply, it was a slaughter."[99]

Coalition bombing of Iraq's civilian infrastructure

In the 23 June 1991, edition of the Washington Post, reporter Bart Gellman wrote: ""Many of the targets were chosen only secondarily to contribute to the military defeat of [Iraq]. . . . Military planners hoped the bombing would amplify the economic and psychological impact of international sanctions on Iraqi society. . . . They deliberately did great harm to Iraq's ability to support itself as an industrial society. . . ."[100] In the Jan/Feb, 1995 edition of Foreign Affairs, French diplomat Eric Rouleau wrote: "[T]he Iraqi people, who were not consulted about the invasion, have paid the price for their government's madness. . . . Iraqis understood the legitimacy of a military action to drive their army from Kuwait, but they have had difficulty comprehending the Allied rationale for using air power to systematically destroy or cripple Iraqi infrastructure and industry: electric power stations (92 percent of installed capacity destroyed), refineries (80 percent of production capacity), petrochemical complexes,telecommunications centers (including 135 telephone networks), bridges (more than 100), roads, highways, railroads, hundreds of locomotives and boxcars full of goods, radio and television broadcasting stations, cement plants, and factories producing aluminum, textiles, electric cables, and medical supplies."[101]

Abuse of coalition POWs

During the conflict coalition aircrew shot down over Iraq were displayed as POWs on TV, most with visible signs of abuse. Amongst several testimonies to poor treatment,[102] Royal Air Force Tornado crew John Nichol and John Peters have both alleged that they were tortured during this time.[103][104] Nichol and Peters were forced to make statements against the war in front of television cameras.

Operation Southern Watch

Since the Gulf war, the U.S. has had a continued presence of 5,000 troops stationed in Saudi Arabia - a figure that rose to 10,000 during the 2003 conflict in Iraq.[105] Operation Southern Watch enforced the no-fly zones over southern Iraq set up after 1991, and the country's oil exports through the shipping lanes of the Persian Gulf are protected by the U.S. Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain.

Since Saudi Arabia houses the holiest sites in Islam (Mecca and Medina) — many Muslims were upset at the permanent military presence. The continued presence of U.S. troops after the Gulf War in Saudi Arabia was one of the stated motivations behind the September 11th terrorist attacks,[105] the Khobar Towers bombing, as well, the date chosen for the 1998 United States embassy bombings (7 August), was eight years to the day that American troops were sent to Saudi Arabia.[106] Bin Laden interpreted the Prophet Muhammad as banning the "permanent presence of infidels in Arabia".[107] In 1996, Bin Laden issued a fatwa, calling for American troops to get out of Saudi Arabia. In the December 1999 interview with Rahimullah Yusufzai, bin Laden said he felt that Americans were "too near to Mecca" and considered this a provocation to the entire Muslim world.[108]

Gulf war sanctions

On 6 August 1990, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 661 which imposed economic sanctions on Iraq, providing for a full trade embargo, excluding medical supplies, food and other items of humanitarian necessity, these to be determined by the Security Council sanctions committee. From 1991 until 2003 the effects of government policy and sanctions regime led to hyperinflation, widespread poverty and malnutrition.

During the latter part of the 1990s the UN considered relaxing the sanctions imposed because of the hardships suffered by ordinary Iraqis. According to UN estimates, between 500,000 and 1.2 million children died during the years of the sanctions.[109] The United States used its veto in the UN Security Council to block the proposal to lift the sanctions because of the continued failure of Iraq to verify disarmament. However, an oil for food program was established in 1996 to ease the effects of sanctions.

Draining of the Qurna Marshes

The draining of the Qurna Marshes was a irrigation project in Iraq during and immediately after the Gulf War, to drain a large area of marshes in the Tigris-Euphrates river system. Formerly covering an area of around 3000 square kilometres, the large complex of wetlands were almost completely emptied of water, and the local shiite population relocated, following the Gulf War and 1991 uprisings. By 2000, United Nations Environment Programme estimated that 90% of the marshlands had disappeared, causing desertification of over 7500 square miles.

Many international organizations such as the U.N. Human Rights Commission, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the International Wildfowl and Wetlands Research Bureau, and Middle East Watch have described the project as a political attempt to force the Marsh Arabs out of the area through water diversion tactics.[110]

Gulf War oil spill

On 23 January, Iraq dumped 400 million gallons of crude oil into the Persian Gulf, causing the largest offshore oil spill in history at that time.[111] It was reported as a deliberate natural resources attack to keep U.S. Marine forces from coming ashore (Missouri and Wisconsin had shelled Failaka Island during the war to reinforce the idea that there would be an amphibious assault attempt). About 30-40% of this came from Allied raids on Iraqi coastal targets.[112]

Kuwaiti oil fires

The Kuwaiti oil fires were caused by Iraqi military forces setting fire to 700 oil wells as part of a scorched earth policy while retreating from Kuwait in 1991 after conquering the country but being driven out by Coalition military forces. The fires started in January and February 1991 and the last one was extinguished by November 1991.[113]

The resulting fires burned out of control because of the dangers of sending in firefighting crews. Land mines had been placed in areas around the oil wells, and a military cleaning of the areas was necessary before the fires could be put out. Somewhere around 6 million barrels (950,000 m3) of oil were lost each day. Eventually, privately contracted crews extinguished the fires, at a total cost of US$1.5 billion to Kuwait.[114] By that time, however, the fires had burned for approximately ten months, causing widespread pollution.

Cost

The cost of the war to the United States was calculated by the United States Congress to be $61.1 billion.[115] About $52 billion of that amount was paid by different countries around the world: $36 billion by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf States; $16 billion by Germany and Japan (which sent no combat forces due to their constitutions). About 25% of Saudi Arabia's contribution was paid in the form of in-kind services to the troops, such as food and transportation.[115] U.S. troops represented about 74% of the combined force, and the global cost was therefore higher.

Media coverage

The Persian Gulf War was a heavily televised war. For the first time people all over the world were able to watch live pictures of missiles hitting their targets and fighters taking off from aircraft carriers. Allied forces were keen to demonstrate the accuracy of their weapons.

In the United States, the "big three" network anchors led the network news coverage of the war: ABC's Peter Jennings, CBS's Dan Rather, and NBC's Tom Brokaw were anchoring their evening newscasts when air strikes began on 16 January 1991. ABC News correspondent Gary Shepard, reporting live from Baghdad, told Jennings of the quietness of the city. But, moments later, Shepard was back on the air as flashes of light were seen on the horizon and tracer fire was heard on the ground.

On CBS, viewers were watching a report from correspondent Allen Pizzey, who was also reporting from Baghdad, when the war began. Rather, after the report was finished, announced that there were unconfirmed reports of flashes in Baghdad and heavy air traffic at bases in Saudi Arabia. On the "NBC Nightly News", correspondent Mike Boettcher reported unusual air activity in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Moments later, Brokaw announced to his viewers that the air attack had begun.

Still, it was CNN which gained the most popularity for their coverage, and indeed its wartime coverage is often cited as one of the landmark events in the development of the network. CNN correspondents John Holliman and Peter Arnett and CNN anchor Bernard Shaw relayed audio reports from the Al-Rashid Hotel as the air strikes began. The network had previously convinced the Iraqi government to allow installation of a permanent audio circuit in their makeshift bureau. When the telephones of all of the other Western TV correspondents went dead during the bombing, CNN was the only service able to provide live reporting. After the initial bombing, Arnett remained behind and was, for a time, the only American TV correspondent reporting from Iraq.

Newspapers all over the world also covered the war and Time magazine published a special issue dated 28 January 1991, the headline "WAR IN THE GULF" emblazoned on the cover over a picture of Baghdad taken as the war began.

U.S. policy regarding media freedom was much more restrictive than in the Vietnam War. The policy had been spelled out in a Pentagon document entitled Annex Foxtrot. Most of the press information came from briefings organised by the military. Only selected journalists were allowed to visit the front lines or conduct interviews with soldiers. Those visits were always conducted in the presence of officers, and were subject to both prior approval by the military and censorship afterward. This was ostensibly to protect sensitive information from being revealed to Iraq. This policy was heavily influenced by the military's experience with the Vietnam War, in which public opposition within the United States grew throughout the course of the war.

At the same time, the coverage of this war was new in its instantaneousness. About halfway through the war, Iraq's government decided to allow live satellite transmissions from the country by Western news organizations, and U.S. journalists returned en masse to Baghdad. Tom Aspell of NBC, Bill Blakemore of ABC, and Betsy Aaron of CBS filed reports, subject to acknowledged Iraqi censorship. Throughout the war, footage of incoming missiles was broadcast almost immediately.

A British crew from CBS News (David Green and Andy Thompson), equipped with satellite transmission equipment traveled with the front line forces and, having transmitted live TV pictures of the fighting en route, arrived the day before the forces in Kuwait City, broadcasting live television from the city and covering the entrance of the Arab forces the following day.

Alternative media outlets provided views in opposition to the Gulf War. Deep Dish Television compiled segments from independent producers in the U.S. and abroad, and produced a ten hour series that was distributed internationally, called The Gulf Crisis TV Project. The first program of this series War, Oil and Power was compiled and released in 1990, before the war broke out. News World Order was the title of another program in the series; it focused on the complicity of the media in promoting the war, as well as Americans' reactions to the media coverage. In San Francisco, as a local example, Paper Tiger Television West produced a weekly cable television show with highlights of mass demonstrations, artists' actions, lectures, and protests against mainstream media coverage at newspaper offices and television stations. Local media outlets in cities across the country screened similar oppositional media.

The organization Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) analyzed media coverage during the Gulf War in various articles and books, such as the 1991 Gulf War Coverage: The Worst Censorship was at Home.

Technology

The USS Missouri launches a Tomahawk missile. The Gulf War was the last conflict in which battleships were deployed in a combat role (as of 2010)

Precision-guided munitions, such as the United States Air Force guided missile AGM-130, were heralded as key in allowing military strikes to be made with a minimum of civilian casualties compared to previous wars, although they were not used as often as more traditional, less accurate bombs. Specific buildings in downtown Baghdad could be bombed whilst journalists in their hotels watched cruise missiles fly by.

Precision-guided munitions amounted to approximately 7.4% of all bombs dropped by the coalition. Other bombs included cluster bombs, which disperse numerous submunitions,[116] and daisy cutters, 15,000-pound bombs which can disintegrate everything within hundreds of yards.

Global Positioning System units were important in enabling coalition units to navigate easily across the desert.

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and satellite communication systems were also important. Two examples of this is the U.S. Navy E-2 Hawkeye and the U.S. Air Force E-3 Sentry. Both were used in command and control area of operations. These systems provided essential communications links between the ground forces, air forces, and the navy. It is one of the many reasons why the air war was dominated by the Coalition Forces.

Scud and Patriot missiles

The role of Iraq's Scud missiles featured prominently in the war. Scud is a tactical ballistic missile that the Soviet Union developed and deployed among the forward deployed Red Army divisions in East Germany. The role of the Scuds which were armed with nuclear and chemical warheads was to destroy command, control, and communication facilities and delay full mobilisation of Western German and Allied Forces in Germany. It could also be used to directly target ground forces.

Scud missiles utilise inertial guidance which operates for the duration that the engines operate. Iraq used Scud missiles, launching them into both Saudi Arabia and Israel. Some missiles caused extensive casualties, while others caused little damage. Concerns were raised of possible chemical or biological warheads on these rockets, but if they existed they were not used.

Scud missiles are not as effective at delivering chemical payloads as is commonly believed because intense heat during the Scud's flight at approximately Mach 5 denatures most of the chemical payload. Chemical weapons are inherently better suited to being delivered by cruise missiles or fighter bombers. The Scud is best suited to delivering tactical nuclear warheads, a role for which it is as capable today as it was when it was first developed.

The U.S. Patriot missile was used for the first time in combat. The U.S. military claimed a high effectiveness against Scuds at the time. Later estimates of the Patriot's effectiveness range widely due to the fact initial testing proved less confidence inspiring than real life combat testing. The Dutch Ministry of Defense (The Netherlands also sent Patriot missiles to protect civilians in Israel and Turkey), for example, later disputed this claim.[67] Further, there is at least one incident of a software error causing a Patriot missile's failure to engage an incoming Scud, resulting in deaths.[117]

Unclassified evidence on Scud interception is lacking. The higher estimates are based on the percentage of Scud warheads which were known to have impacted and exploded compared to the number of Scud missiles launched, but other factors such as duds, misses and impacts which were not reported confound these. Some Scud variations were re-engineered in a manner outside their original tolerance, and said to have frequently failed or broken up in flight.

The lowest estimates are typically based upon the number of interceptions where there is proof that the warhead was hit by at least one missile, but due to the way the Al-Hussein (Scud derivative) missiles broke up in flight, it was often hard to tell which piece was the warhead, and there were few radar tracks which were actually stored which could be analyzed later. Their performance will not be known for many years. Both the U.S. Army and the missile manufacturers maintain the Patriot delivered a "miracle performance" in the Gulf War.[118]

Alternate names for the Gulf War

The following names have been used to describe the conflict itself:

Operational Names

Most of the Coalition Force countries used various names for operational phases of the war. These are sometimes used as the name of the conflict, especially Desert Storm:

In addition, various phases of each operation may have a unique operational name.

Campaigns

The US divided the conflict into three major campaigns:

See also

Regional wars:

General:

Notes and references

  1. "Historical Events on 30th November". Historyorb.com. http://www.historyorb.com/events/november/30. Retrieved 2010-03-18. 
  2. Gulf War, the Sandhurst-trained Prince Khaled bin Sultan al-Saud was co commander with General Norman Schwarzkopf www.casi.org.uk/discuss
  3. General Khaled was Co-Commander, with U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf, of the allied coalition that liberated Kuwait www.thefreelibrary.com
  4. Gulf War Coalition Forces (Latest available) by country www.nationmaster.com
  5. 5.0 5.1 Geoffrey Regan, p.214
  6. 2010 World Almanac and Book of Facts, Pg. 176, Published 2009, Published by World Almanac Books; ISBN 1-60057-105-0
  7. 7.0 7.1 "Persian Gulf War - MSN Encarta". Archived from the original on 2009-10-31. http://www.webcitation.org/5kwqMXGNZ. 
  8. "The Use of Terror during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait". The Jewish Agency for Israel. Archived from the original on 2005-01-24. http://web.archive.org/web/20050124091425/http://www.jafi.org.il/education/actual/iraq/3.html. Retrieved 2010-06-22. 
  9. "The Wages of War: Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 2003 Conflict". Project on Defense Alternatives. http://www.comw.org/pda/0310rm8ap2.html#1.%20Iraqi%20civilian%20fatalities%20in%20the%201991%20Gulf. Retrieved 2009-05-09. 
  10. 10.0 10.1 10.2 [1]
  11. 11.0 11.1 "DOD: Information Paper- Iraq's Scud Ballistic Missiles". Iraqwatch.org. http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/Pentagon/dodscud.htm. Retrieved 2010-03-18. 
  12. "BBC ON THIS DAY | 17 | 1991: 'Mother of all Battles' begins". BBC News. 16 January 1991. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/17/newsid_2530000/2530375.stm. Retrieved 2010-03-18. 
  13. http://ehistory.osu.edu/world/WarView.Cfm?WID=41
  14. "Frontline Chronology" (PDF). Public Broadcasting Service. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/cron/. Retrieved 2007-03-20. 
  15. Tenth anniversary of the Gulf War: A look back. CNN. 16 January 2001. Archived from the original on 16 January 2001. http://web.archive.org/web/19960101-re_/http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/01/16/gulf.anniversary/index.html 
  16. Kenneth Estes. "ISN: The Second Gulf War (1990-1991) - Council on Foreign Relations". Cfr.org. http://www.cfr.org/publication/13865/isn.html. Retrieved 2010-03-18. 
  17. Peters, John E; Deshong, Howard (1995). Out of Area or Out of Reach? European Military Support for Operations in Southwest Asia. RAND. ISBN 0833023292. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR629.pdf. 
  18. Douglas A. Borer (2003). "Inverse Engagement: Lessons from U.S.-Iraq Relations, 1982–1990". U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection. U.S. Army. http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume1/july_2003/7_03_2v2.html. Retrieved 2006-10-12. 
  19. Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. 2nd Ed pg. 464
  20. Duiker, William J; Spielvogel, Jackson J. World History: From 1500. 5th edition. Belmont, California, USA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007. Pp. 839.
  21. Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. 2nd Ed pg. 463
  22. Academic forum for foreign affairs, Austria.
  23. Eyewitness, Col. Fred Hart 1
  24. Cooper, Tom; Sadik, Ahmad (September 16, 2003). "Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait; 1990". Air Combat Information Group. http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_213.shtml. Retrieved April 17, 2010. 
  25. 25.0 25.1 The Significance of the "Death" of Ali Hassan al-Majid By Ibrahim al-Marashi
  26. BBC News. "1990: Outrage at Iraqi TV hostage show". Retrieved 2 September 2007.
  27. Lori Fisler Damrosch, International Law, Cases and Materials, West Group, 2001
  28. "Confrontation in the Gulf -- Proposals by Iraqi President: Excerpts From His Address," New York Times, August 13, 1990, p. A8
  29. Editorial, "The issue is still Kuwait," Financial Times (London), August 13, 1990, p. 12
  30. MIDDLE EAST CRISIS Secret Offer Iraq Sent Pullout Deal to U.S.; [ALL EDITIONS] By Knut Royce. Newsday Washington Bureau. Newsday. (Combined editions). Long Island, N.Y.: Aug 29, 1990. (excerpt: "Iraq has told the White House it will withdraw from Kuwait and allow foreigners to leave, but in return it wants United Nations sanctions lifted, guaranteed access to the Persian Gulf and sole control of an oil field that dips into Kuwait, according to sources involved in the secret offer and memoranda detailing its content. Iraq's message was delivered to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft on Thursday by a former high-ranking U.S. official. Contacted by Newsday yesterday, the former official confirmed he had relayed Iraq's proposal to the White House"
  31. MIDDLE EAST CRISIS Secret Offer Iraq Sent Pullout Deal to U.S.; [ALL EDITIONS] By Knut Royce. Newsday Washington Bureau. Newsday. (Combined editions). Long Island, N.Y.: Aug 29, 1990 (excerpt:"The former official, who spoke on condition he not be further identified, acknowledged he was unsure whether the proposal was a serious offer or merely "floating something to see whether you're going to bite or not." At a luncheon with Scowcroft several days earlier, the national security adviser had told the former official that the United States was "not blind" to negotiations and was "trying to do everything without taking the military option," according to a private summary of that meeting. At the same time, the United States was "waiting to see the result of the {UN-imposed} economic sanctions" to prod Iraq from Kuwait. A White House spokesman said he was aware that Iraq has been floating some "trial balloons" but reaffirmed President George Bush's stated precondition that Iraq pull out of Kuwait, allow the restoration of its government and release all hostages before any negotiations begin. Nevertheless, one administration official who specializes in Mideast affairs said, "The terms of the proposal are serious," and he described the package as "negotiable." Of significance, he said, was the fact that Iraq made no mention in its proposal of a precondition that the United States pull its troops out of Saudi Arabia. The official also noted that the proposal follows earlier ones that contained what he described as "impossible demands," such as linking a pullout from Kuwait with an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied West Bank and Gaza. The message was delivered during a period of extreme tension as Iraq threatened to evict diplomats from the embassies in Kuwait and the administration, according to sources, was contemplating military retaliation. According to a document outlining the proposal, Iraq would agree to withdraw from Kuwait and allow foreigners to leave the country. In return, UN economic sanctions would be lifted...Iraq's proposal to the White House originated from the foreign ministry in Baghdad "and higherups" - by inference President Saddam Hussein. Thursday's message was delivered to the former administration official by an Iraqi-born American friend of his with extensive business ties in Iraq, according to memoranda obtained by Newsday. The documents were provided on condition that those involved in the secret proposal not be identified. The Iraqi-born American and another American, who is described in the memoranda as someone "close" to White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, were in Baghdad when Iraq invaded Kuwait on Aug. 2. They had sought to leave shortly after the invasion but were asked by an influential Iraqi official who is close to Hussein to stay on for a few days while Iraq prepared a "message" for the Bush administration, the documents show."
  32. MIDDLE EAST CRISIS Secret Offer Iraq Sent Pullout Deal to U.S.; [ALL EDITIONS] By Knut Royce. Newsday Washington Bureau. Newsday. (Combined editions). Long Island, N.Y.: Aug 29, 1990 (excerpt:"According to a document outlining the proposal, Iraq would agree to withdraw from Kuwait and allow foreigners to leave the country. In return, UN economic sanctions would be lifted. Iraq would gain "guaranteed access" to the Persian Gulf through the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warbah and gain full control of the Rumailah oil field that extends slightly into Kuwaiti territory from Iraq. In addition, Iraq's proposal includes offers to negotiate an oil agreement with the United States 'satisfactory to both nations' national security interests,' develop a joint plan 'to alleviate Iraq's economical and financial problems' and 'jointly work on the stability of the gulf.'"
  33. MIDDLE EAST CRISIS Secret Offer Iraq Sent Pullout Deal to U.S.; [ALL EDITIONS] By Knut Royce. Newsday Washington Bureau. Newsday. (Combined editions). Long Island, N.Y.: Aug 29, 1990 (excerpt:"A White House spokesman said he was aware that Iraq has been floating some "trial balloons" but reaffirmed President George Bush's stated precondition that Iraq pull out of Kuwait, allow the restoration of its government and release all hostages before any negotiations begin. Nevertheless, one administration official who specializes in Mideast affairs said, "The terms of the proposal are serious," and he described the package as "negotiable." Of significance, he said, was the fact that Iraq made no mention in its proposal of a precondition that the United States pull its troops out of Saudi Arabia. The official also noted that the proposal follows earlier ones that contained what he described as "impossible demands," such as linking a pullout from Kuwait with an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied West Bank and Gaza."
  34. Understanding Power, Peter R. Mitchell, John Schoeffel: online footnotes. Chapter 5, footnote 88,
  35. "Secret Offer: Iraq Sent Pullout Deal to U.S.," Newsday, August 29, 1990, p. 3.
  36. "U.S.: Iraqi Proposal Not Worth a Response," Newsday, August 30, 1990, p. 6. An excerpt: The administration has acknowledged Newsday reports that possible peace feelers were received from Iraqi officials offering to withdraw from Kuwait in return for the lifting of economic sanctions and other concessions, but they were dismissed as not serious. Asked why they were not pursued to test whether they were serious, the senior official said, "I don't know."
  37. Iraq Offers Deal to Quit Kuwait U.S. rejects it, but stays `interested'; [NASSAU AND SUFFOLK Edition] By Knut Royce. WASHINGTON BUREAU. Newsday. (Combined editions). Long Island, N.Y.: Jan 3, 1991. pg. 05 (excerpt: "Iraq has offered to withdraw from Kuwait if the United States pledges not to attack as soldiers are pulled out, if foreign troops leave the region, and if there is agreement on the Palestinian problem and on the banning of all weapons of mass destruction in the region"
  38. Iraq Offers Deal to Quit Kuwait U.S. rejects it, but stays `interested'; [NASSAU AND SUFFOLK Edition] By Knut Royce. WASHINGTON BUREAU. Newsday. (Combined editions). Long Island, N.Y.: Jan 3, 1991. pg. 05 (excerpt: "U.S. officials disclosed yesterday. Although the White House immediately dismissed the proposal as inadequate since it contains preconditions for a pullout, other government officials described it as 'interesting' because it drops previous claims to two Kuwaiti islands and a portion of an oil field, and because it signals Iraqi interest in a negotiated settlement."
  39. See Knut Royce, "Iraq Offers Deal to Quit Kuwait," Newsday, January 3, 1991, p. 5 (city edition, p. 4).
  40. See Patrick Tyler, "Arafat Eases Stand on Kuwait-Palestine Link," New York Times, January 3, 1991, p. A8
  41. "Confrontation in the Gulf: Behind Bush's Hard Line," New York Times, August 22, 1990, p. A1
  42. See Paul Lewis, "Confrontation in the Gulf: The U.N.; France and 3 Arab States Issue an Appeal to Hussein," New York Times, January 15, 1991, p. A12
  43. Michael Kranish et al., "World waits on brink of war: Late effort at diplomacy in gulf fails," Boston Globe, January 16, 1991, p. 1
  44. Ellen Nimmons, A.P., "Last-ditch pitches for peace; But U.S. claims Iraqis hold key," Houston Chronicle, January 15, 1991, p. 1
  45. Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam.
  46. "The Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Timeline". Archived from the original on 2008-05-25. http://web.archive.org/web/20080526135240rn_1/www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45404. Retrieved 30 June 2010. 
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  48. Essential Documents: UN Security Council Resolution 678. Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/11205/un_security_council_resolution_678_iraq_kuwait.html?breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2F408%2Fkuwait 
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  50. Lynch, Colum (1 November 2006). "Security Council Seat Tied to Aid". washingtonpost.com. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/31/AR2006103101217.html. Retrieved 2010-03-18. 
  51. Miller Center of Public Affairs - Presidential Speech Archive
  52. In war, some facts less factual | csmonitor.com
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  56. Makiya 1993, pp 31-33
  57. Makiya 1993, p 32.
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Bibliography

Films about the Persian Gulf War

Novels about the Gulf War

Video games related to the Gulf War

External links